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A CLASH OF PRINCIPLES: PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION AND TWO-LEVEL 
UTILITARIANISM IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
 
WESLEY M. BERNHARDT*  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Utilitarianism provides the best analytic framework for “minimum 
contacts” analyses in multi-state mass tort litigation. Utilitarianism is a 
consequentialist ethical philosophy contending that one should act in a 
way that maximizes utility; that is, act in a way that maximizes pleasure 
and minimizes pain. This is often referred to as the “felicific calculus.”1 
To maintain a civil lawsuit against a defendant, a court must have 
“personal jurisdiction” over that defendant, meaning that the defendant 
must have minimum contacts related to the suit such that maintenance of 
the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.2 This is referred to as the “minimum contacts” test.3 The minimum 
contacts test serves two primary functions: first, ensuring that litigation 
takes place in a convenient forum; and second, ensuring that states do not 
intrude on the sovereignty of other states.4 The former function can be 
seen as a form of utilitarianism, whereby the court effectively weighs the 
costs and benefits of maintaining litigation in the given forum. However, 
the former function can conflict with the latter, more formalist function of 
maintaining a federalist system. This conflict featured in the recent 
Supreme Court case Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court, where the 
Supreme Court ruled that California did not have personal jurisdiction 
over mass tort claims from Oklahoma consumers, even though the exact 
same claims were being brought in California.5 In this case, the Supreme 
Court affirmed that in minimum contacts analyses, the formalist function 
is more important than the utilitarian one. The purpose of this note is to 
argue that the utilitarian function of minimum contacts should subsume 
the formalist one. 
 
 
 
 
           *  J.D. Candidate, Washington University School of Law Class of 2019. 
 1.  JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 1, n.1 (1823) (“The word utility does not so clearly point to the ideas of pleasure and 
pain as the words felicity and happiness do . . . ”) (emphasis in original). 
 2.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
           3. See id. 
 4. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780–81 (2017).  
           5.  See id. at 1776. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The first section of this note, titled “Background,” explores the 
philosophy of Utilitarianism, especially as laid out by Jeremy Bentham 
and Richard Hare. Additionally, it explores the doctrines of personal 
jurisdiction under current Supreme Court precedent, especially as it relates 
to multi-state litigation.  
The “Analysis” section explores the clash between utilitarianism and 
federalism within personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. Next, the doctrinal 
and pragmatic issues of valuing federalism over utilitarianism are 
discussed, with a particular emphasis on how the cyber age warrants a new 
conception of personal jurisdiction and an overturning of International 
Shoe, Co. v. Washington. Finally, a new standard for personal jurisdiction, 
modeled on Richard Hare’s two-level utilitarianism, is presented as a 
viable alternative for personal jurisdiction jurisprudence in the modern 
information age. 
BACKGROUND 
 
I. WHAT IS UTILITARIANISM? 
 
Utilitarianism is an ethical philosophy postulating that the morally 
“right” action is the one that best maximizes “utility.”6 But how is “utility” 
defined? Jeremy Bentham, the father of modern utilitarianism, defined 
“utility” as that which maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain.7 Bentham 
named this “the principle of utility,” although it is often referred to as the 
“felicific calculus.”8 Bentham conceptualized pleasure and pain as the two 
“sovereign masters” with complete control over what a person should do 
and what a person ought to do.9 
A. Felicific Calculus 
The abstract principles of “pleasure” and “pain” leave much to the 
imagination. Is pleasure defined purely as that which most activates the 
brain’s reward system? Or is it defined more broadly as that which is pro-
social? Is it that which progresses humanity forward, rather than 
backwards? If the latter, how is pro-social defined? If “pro-social” can be 
 
 
  6. BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
  7. Id. at 2. 
  8. See id. at 1, n.1; see also Linda S. Mullenix, Burying (With Kindness) the Felicific 
Calculus of Civil Procedure, 40 VAND. L. REV. 541, 557 (1987) (“Bentham postulated the felicific 
calculus, a method of codifying the law based on the ‘greatest happiness’ utility principle.”). 
  9. BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 1–2.  
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defined, who defines it?10 Fortunately, Jeremy Bentham provided us at 
least some guidance: 
By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to 
produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in 
the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to 
the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or 
unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party 
be the community in general, then the happiness of the community: 
if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual.11 
Indeed, Bentham’s felicific calculus accounts for goodness of the 
individual and goodness of society as a whole.12 Bentham defined society 
as a fictitious construct consisting of individual “members,” and defined 
the “good of society” as the sum of the good of society’s members.13 
Therefore, the distinction between individual-level utility and societal 
utility collapses in Bentham’s utilitarianism, because in his conception, 
societal utility encapsulates individual-level utility.14 
Bentham uses “pleasure” as a metaphor for that which has a greater 
tendency to augment than diminish the happiness of the community, and 
“pain” as a metaphor for that which has a greater tendency to diminish 
than augment the happiness of the community.15 Bentham even applied his 
felicific calculus to the law more broadly, using the phrase “law or dictate 
of utility” as a useful phrase to describe laws conforming to the principle 
of utility.16  
 
 
           10. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(“Petitioners make strong arguments rooted in social policy and considerations of fairness. They contend that 
same-sex couples should be allowed to affirm their love and commitment through marriage, just like 
opposite-sex couples . . . . But this Court is not a legislature. Whether same-sex marriage is a good idea 
should be of no concern to us. Under the Constitution, judges have power to say what the law is, not what it 
should be.”). But see id. at 2605 (“The dynamic of our constitutional system is that individuals need not await 
legislative action before asserting a fundamental right. The Nation's courts are open to injured individuals 
who come to them to vindicate their own direct, personal stake in our basic charter.”). 
 11. BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 2. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See id. at 3. 
 14. See id. (“The interest of the community then is, what?—the sum of the interests of the several 
members who compose it. . . . It is in vain to talk of the interest of the community, without understanding 
what is the interest of the individual.”). 
 15. See id. at 4 (“A thing is said to promote the interest, or to be for the interest, of an individual, 
when it tends to add to the sum total of his pleasures: or, what comes to the same thing, to diminish the sum 
total of his pains.”); see also id. at 2. Bentham explains: 
By the principle of utility it is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action 
whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the 
happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to 
promote or to oppose that happiness.  
Id. 
            16. See BENTHAM, supra note 1. 
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The felicific calculus can be understood, in the context of 
governmental action, with the following set of rules. First, a governmental 
action is a dictate of utility if it maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain.17 
Second, pleasure is that which has a tendency to augment the happiness of 
the community, and pain is that which has the tendency to diminish the 
happiness of the community.18 Third, the happiness of the community is 
the sum of the happiness of its individual members.19 Therefore, if a 
governmental action has a greater tendency to augment the sum happiness 
of the members of society than diminish that happiness, then that 
governmental action is a dictate of utility.20 Yet, this formulation still 
leaves two unanswered questions: First, how is a governmental action’s 
tendency to augment or diminish happiness calculated? Second, how is 
“governmental action” defined? Jeremy Bentham provides us an answer to 
the first question, but no specific answer to the second. 
B. The Seven Factors of Happiness 
Bentham articulated seven factors through which a governmental 
action’s tendency to augment or diminish happiness could be calculated.21 
These are: (1) intensity, (2) duration, (3) probability, (4) remoteness, (5) 
fecundity, (6) purity, and (7) extent.22 
The first four factors are simple and mostly self-explanatory. The first 
factor, intensity, refers to the strength of the pleasure or pain. For example, 
it is not uncommon for physicians to ask incoming patients to describe 
their pain on a scale of one to ten.23 Such a scale is analogous to 
Bentham’s “intensity” factor. The second factor, duration, refers to the 
length of time for which the pleasure or pain lasts. The third factor, 
probability, refers to the likelihood that the pleasure or pain will result. 
The fourth factor, remoteness, refers to the pleasure or pain’s proximity to 
the present. 
These four factors are not wholly distinct, but rather blend together to 
form the heart of the felicific calculus. For example, highly improbable but 
highly intense pain could have wildly different values depending upon the 
duration of the pain. Furthermore, the probability of a pleasure or pain 
could increase or decrease depending upon the other three factors. Driving 
 
 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See id. at 22.  
 22. Id.  
 23. See Warren Grant Magnuson Clinical Center, Pain Intensity Instruments (2003) (available on 
file with the National Institutes of Health).  
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over the speed limit is a particularly illustrative example. At just a few 
miles over the speed limit, the most probable pains are those that are 
relatively non-intense and short lasting, such as speeding tickets. As the 
speeding increases ten, twenty, or thirty miles over the speed limit, the 
likelihood of more intense, long-lasting pains, such as death, increase. 
Similarly, the same amount of remoteness can tip the scale in different 
directions in different circumstance. In other words, both pressing and 
remote pleasures or pains can be blessings or curses depending upon the 
situation. Some pains are better handled in the present, and some pleasures 
become more intense as time progresses. Conversely, frontloading pain 
can decrease its intensity, and momentary, fleeting pleasures often evolve 
into intense, long-lasting pain. Thus, remoteness can be best understood as 
a factor modifying the other six factors in different ways in different 
situations. 
The next two factors, fecundity and purity, are less self-explanatory. 
Fecundity, in the contexts of human demography and population 
demography, refers to the reproductive capacity of an organism or 
population.24 Fecundity has a similar meaning in the context of Bentham’s 
felicific calculus.25 Here, it refers to the pleasure’s probability of causing 
further pleasure, and the pain’s probability of causing further pain.26 
Fecundity can thus be articulated as a result’s self-reproductivity.27 Purity 
is the mirror-image of fecundity, and refers to the probability that the 
pleasing or painful act itself will not cause the opposite.28 Purity can thus 
be articulated as the improbability of unintended negative consequences of 
pleasures and silver linings of pains.29 
An illustrative example of fecundity is drug addiction. In the case of 
heroin addiction, as the number of usage experiences increases, the 
likelihood of the negative effects of heroin being duplicated in the future 
increases, precisely because addiction makes it likelier for the user to use 
the substance again in the future. Addiction is also an illustrative example 
of impure pains and pleasures. Although recreational drugs can be 
addictive and lead to deleterious life-outcomes (pain), they are used and 
abused primarily for their euphoric effects (pleasure). Conversely, their 
euphoric effects (pleasure) incentivizes the addiction (pain) in the first 
place. 
 
 
 24. See, e.g., U.N. ASIAN DEV. INST., A GLOSSARY OF SOME TERMS OF DEMOGRAPHY 30 
(2003).  
 25. See BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 22. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. 
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The last factor, extent, refers to the pleasure or pain’s spread across the 
community.30 In other words, extent refers to how particularized or 
generalized a pleasure or pain is.31 For example, drug addiction would 
have a lower extent if drug addiction was concentrated to a small portion 
of a society. Conversely, drug addiction would have a greater extent if it 
had reached epidemic proportions. 
C. “Governmental Action”: Act and Rule Utilitarianism 
Still unanswered in the felicific calculus is the definition of 
“governmental action.” Are we asking if a singular governmental action 
conforms to the principle of utility, or are we asking if the principle or law 
underlying that action conforms to the principle of utility? These are 
problematic questions for utilitarianism not just in the governmental 
context, but elsewhere as well. Should an individual, in following 
Bentham’s felicific calculus, perform the calculus as to each individual 
action they take, or should the individual follow a set of rules or 
principles that, if followed, will maximize utility? 
The individual action approach to the felicific calculus looks appealing 
at first glance. An accurate calculation of happiness can be more readily 
achieved if the decision-making process is unconstrained with bright-line 
rules. Many decisions will have new circumstances and variables that a 
rule would be unable to account for. A rule may over-emphasize some of 
Bentham’s seven factors, while de-emphasizing others, leading to 
inaccurate calculations when the de-emphasized factors are acutely 
important, and vice versa. Thus, although a rule approach to the felicific 
calculus may maximize happiness in most circumstances, the individual 
act approach could in theory lead to that maximization in all 
circumstances. 
The individual act approach is not, however, without its flaws. One 
flaw of the individual approach is decision fatigue. Decision fatigue refers 
to the diminished ability to make sound decisions after a long series of 
decisions.32 In the words of Roy Baumeister, “[m]aking decisions uses the 
very same willpower that you use to say no to doughnuts, drugs, or illicit 
sex.”33 In felicific calculus terms, decision fatigue means that as the 
number of successive decisions increase, the utility of the actor’s actions 
will decrease. Therefore, if decision fatigue exists as a phenomenon, the 
 
 
       30.   See id. 
       31.   See id. 
 32. See Drake Baer, The Scientific Reason Why Barack Obama and Mark Zuckerberg Wear the 
Same Outfit Every Day, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 28, 2015, 9:47 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/barack-obama-mark-zuckerberg-wear-the-same-outfit-2015-4. 
 33. See id. 
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rule approach to the felicific calculus could overcome its shortcomings by 
counteracting the decision fatigue inherent in the individual approach to 
the felicific calculus. 
Politics and law provide two excellent examples of decision fatigue. In 
the political world, Barack Obama’s wardrobe represents a concerted 
effort to avoid decision fatigue.34 While he was President, Mr. Obama 
wore only two suit colors: gray or navy.35 His wardrobe’s limited color 
scheme was predicated on an understanding of decision fatigue.36 In other 
words, because a President must make numerous decisions every day 
involving the safety, security, and prosperity of 320 million people, it 
would be unwise to use time and energy on something as mundane as 
attire.37 
In the realm of law, evidence of decision fatigue can be seen in judicial 
decision-making.38 For example, a study of parole board decisions found 
that prisoners seeking parole are less likely to receive parole if a parole 
board decides their case later in the day, after the board has already made 
numerous decisions throughout the day.39 By contrast, prisoners seeking 
parole earlier in the day were far likelier to receive their requested relief.40 
These examples showcase the downside of the act-based utilitarianism 
while simultaneously showcasing the benefits of a rule-based 
utilitarianism. In rule-based utilitarianism, no individual decisions are 
made. Rather, the only decision to be made is what rule or standard to 
follow. Rule-based utilitarianism can thus be described as frontloading the 
felicific calculus in anticipation of decision making, as opposed to 
performing the calculus at every decision fork. Although any rule or 
standard that guides actions will always produce results that, in some 
instances, are not dictates of utility, a rule based approach to utilitarianism 
can overcome this flaw by limiting or eliminating the deleterious effects of 
decision fatigue.41 
  
 
 
       34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. 
 38. I Think It's Time We Broke for Lunch…, THE ECONOMIST, (Apr. 16, 2011), 
https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2011/04/14/i-think-its-time-we-broke-for-lunch.  
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. 
       41.   See R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD, AND POINT 39 (1981) (“A further 
reason for relying in much of our moral conduct on relatively general principles is that, if we do not, 
we expose ourselves to constant temptation to special pleading. In practice, especially when in haste or 
under stress, we may easily, being human, ‘cook’ our moral thinking to suit our own interest.”) 
(citation omitted). 
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This tension between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism can be 
seen throughout the land of the law.42 Often, disputes in legal discourse 
turn on whether a court of law applies a bright line rule or a multi-factored 
standard.43 In such instances, bright-line rules closely mirror rule 
utilitarianism, and factor-tests or standards lean closer to act 
utilitarianism.44 Act and rule utilitarianism are not, however, diametrically 
opposed poles with no place in between. Rather, these two approaches to 
the felicific calculus can be synthesized, each being used in different 
circumstances.45 This synthesis is called two-level utilitarianism.46 
D. Two-Level Utilitarianism 
R.M. Hare first conceptualized two-level utilitarianism in his book, 
Moral Thinking, in 1981.47 According to Hare, there existed two extreme 
poles of people: “archangels” and “proles.”48 Archangels are those human 
beings whose superior intellectual and cognitive abilities allowed their 
every decision to be a dictate of utility, thus eliminating their need for 
guiding rules or principles.49 Archangels would never succumb to decision 
fatigue and represent Hare’s personification of act utilitarianism.50  
Hare also described “proles”: people who because of their intellectual 
inability to perform the felicific calculus, act by guiding principles in 
every instance to conform to the principle of utility.51 Proles thus represent 
Hare’s personification of rule utilitarianism.52 It is important to note, 
however, that archangels and proles were not designed to be real people, 
but rather mental constructs personifying two-level utilitarianism.53 
Further, Hare believed that most human beings fell somewhere between 
archangels and proles.54 
  
 
 
           42. Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 380 (1985) (“[D]isputes that 
pit a rule against a standard are extremely common in legal discourse.”). 
           43. See id. 
           44. See id. 
           45. HARE, supra note 41, at 43 (“The two kinds of utilitarianism, therefore, can coexist at 
their respective levels . . .”). 
           46. Id. at 43.  
           47. Id. 
           48. Id. at 44–45. 
           49. See id. at 44. 
           50. See id. Hare refers to the archangel’s use of act utilitarianism as “critical moral thinking.”  
 51. See id. at 45. 
 52. See HARE, supra note 41. Hare refers to the prole’s use of rule utilitarianism as “intuitive 
moral thinking.” Id. 
 53. See id.  
 54. See id. (“[W]e all share the characteristics of both to limited and varying degrees and at 
different times.”). 
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Hare contended that to conform to the principle of utility, one must act 
as an “archangel” in some circumstances and a “prole” in others.55 In other 
words, act and rule utilitarianism could be synthesized such that the 
positives of both could be realized and the negatives of both could be 
diminished.56 In furtherance of this synthesis, Hare contended that one 
should act as a prole in every situation that did not fall into one of three 
special categories: (1) when guiding principles conflict with one another; 
(2) when unusual circumstances make the otherwise applicable principle 
inapplicable; and (3) when the situation requires you to select a guiding 
principle.57 
Although the utilitarianism of both Bentham and Hare has wide-
ranging applications to the law generally, it has an especially close 
relationship with personal jurisdiction. However, this relationship is 
countered in modern jurisprudence by the blunt axe of federalism. The 
succeeding sections discuss these personal jurisdiction doctrines and 
contend that Hare’s two-level utilitarianism provides the best model for a 
new personal jurisdiction doctrine. 
II. WHAT IS PERSONAL JURISDICTION? 
A. Limitations on a Court’s Coercive Power 
Both state and federal courts in the United States have a limited ability 
to hale non-residents into their courts. State courts are limited by the 
constraints of their own state’s laws. The exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over an out-of-state defendant by both state and federal courts is limited 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.58 
State courts are normally granted jurisdiction by state statutes.59 
Statutes that grant state courts’ the ability to assert jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants are commonly referred to as “long-arm” statutes.60 
 
 
 55. See id. at 46–47.  
If we wish to ensure the greatest possible conformity to what an archangel would pronounce, 
we have to try to implant in ourselves and in others whom we influence a set of dispositions, 
motivations, intuitions, prima facie principles (call them what we will) which will have this 
effect. We are on the whole more likely to succeed in this way than by aiming to think like 
archangels on occasions when we have neither the time nor the capacity for it.  
Id. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See HARE, supra note 41. 
           58. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
Note, however, that the Due Process Clause’s limitation on a federal district court’s exercise of 
personal jurisdiction is indirect, through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 4. 
           59. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2017). 
           60. See id. 
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Each state places their own conditions on its courts’ exercise of “long-
arm” jurisdiction through these statutes.61 For example, the State of 
Mississippi’s long-arm statute limits its courts’ long-arm jurisdiction to 
cases involving a defendant doing business in the state, committing a tort 
in the state, or making a contract with a resident of the state to be 
performed in whole or in part in the state.62 In contrast, California’s long-
arm statute places no additional limitations on its courts’ long-arm 
jurisdictions beyond the limitations in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.63 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes a 
state’s ability to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law.64 The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to apply 
to a state court’s exercise of power over a non-resident defendant. In 
International Shoe, it articulated the following test:  
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a 
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of 
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.’65 
This often-quoted language from International Shoe is referred to as 
the “minimum contacts” test, and its requirements must be met for a state 
court to render a valid judgment against a non-resident defendant.66 This 
same test applies to a United States District Court’s exercise of jurisdiction 
over a defendant.67 If the minimum contacts test is satisfied, the court can 
then exercise either “specific” or “general” jurisdiction over the out-of-
state defendant.68 
B. General Jurisdiction 
General jurisdiction, occasionally referred to as “all-purpose” 
jurisdiction, exists where a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are 
so “continuous and systematic” that the defendant can fairly be regarded 
 
 
 61. See id. 
 62. MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (West 2017). 
 63. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2017). 
 64. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 65. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); compare Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 
316, with Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (holding that a state court could only exercise 
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if that defendant held property in the forum state). 
 66. See Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980). 
 67. FED. R. CIV. P. 4. 
 68. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
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as being “at home” in the forum state.69 These contacts with the forum 
state do not have to be related to the underlying controversy being 
litigated.70 In the case of an individual defendant, the court will have 
general jurisdiction over the defendant if that defendant is a citizen of that 
state.71 In the case of a corporate defendant, a court will have general 
jurisdiction over the defendant if the defendant is incorporated in that state 
or if the defendant has its “principal place of business” in that state.72 
However, a court can, in exceptional circumstances, exercise general 
jurisdiction over a corporate defendant even where the defendant is not 
incorporated and does not have its principal place of business in the forum 
state.73 
C. Specific Jurisdiction 
The minimum contacts test can also be satisfied where the defendant’s 
contacts are connected to the underlying controversy. Exercise of 
jurisdiction in these circumstances is referred to as “specific 
jurisdiction.”74 General jurisdiction analyses typically examine the volume 
and quantity of a defendant’s connections with the forum state.75  By 
contrast, in specific jurisdiction analyses, a court will examine the 
affiliation between the forum state and the underlying controversy at 
hand.76 Specific jurisdiction could perhaps be characterized as a tripartite 
relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.77 
Although Supreme Court precedent is clear that tangential, tenuous, or 
limited connections with a forum state will not suffice for specific 
jurisdiction, it has yet to endorse a specific test to determine the 
sufficiency of a defendant’s contacts for specific jurisdiction. Two 
differing, and at times conflicting, tests appear in Supreme Court 
precedent: the “purposeful availment” test and the “stream of commerce” 
test. 
Under the purposeful availment test, a defendant’s contacts with a 
forum state will be deemed sufficient for specific jurisdiction where the 
defendant has “purposefully availed themselves” of the laws of the forum 
 
 
 69. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–15 (1984). 
 70. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 123–24 (2014). 
 71. Id. at 137. 
 72. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984). 
 73. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 128–31. 
 74. Arthur T. Von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested 
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966). 
 75. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 128–31. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). 
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state.78 This entails some purposeful action by the defendant that 
establishes ties between the defendant and the forum state.79 By contrast, it 
is insufficient under this test that the defendant could foresee the 
possibility of suit in the forum state.80 Therefore, unilateral actions by 
third parties, such as other companies, subsidiaries, or the plaintiff, are 
also insufficient under this purposeful availment test.81 
For example, in Asahi, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile 
accident, and claimed as the cause of the accident a defective product by a 
Taiwanese manufacturer.82 After the plaintiff sued the Taiwanese 
manufacturer in California state court, the manufacturer indemnified the 
original creator of the defective part, Asahi, a Japanese corporation.83 
Eventually, the original lawsuit settled, with only the indemnity action 
remaining.84 Under the purposeful availment test, the court found Asahi’s 
contacts with California insufficient for a finding of specific jurisdiction.85 
The court reasoned that Asahi’s only real contact with California was its 
affiliation with the Taiwanese manufacturer, and because unilateral actions 
by third parties were insufficient under the purposeful availment test, 
Asahi did not have minimum contacts with California and could not be 
brought to suit there.86 
The proponents of the “purposeful availment” test point to two primary 
concerns in their support of the test: notice and predictability. By requiring 
that a defendant must have directed some purposeful action into the forum 
state, proponents reason that defendants will almost always be on notice of 
when and where they could possibly be brought to suit.87 It is further 
reasoned that if a defendant is on notice of when and where it can be 
brought to suit, it can thereby do things to avoid litigation if it so choses, 
such as purchasing liability insurance or passing the costs of litigation onto  
  
 
 
 78. See Asahi Metal Indust. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. 480 U.S. 102, 110 (1987). 
 79. Id. at 108; see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 80. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 109. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 105–06. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 112. 
 86. Id. Although Justice O’Connor authored the “majority” opinion, she was only joined by three 
other justices in her endorsement of the purposeful availment test. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105. Justice 
Brennan authored a concurring opinion endorsing a version of the “stream of commerce” test for 
specific jurisdiction. Id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 87. Id. at 110. 
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the consumer vis-à-vis higher prices.88 Because the purposeful availment 
test is relatively concrete and predictable, corporate defendants can 
thereby make reasoned, calculated decisions regarding where and how to 
do business.89 
Only four justices endorsed “purposeful availment” in Asahi, not a 
fully majority.90 Instead, there exists another test to determine whether a 
corporate defendant’s contacts are sufficient for specific jurisdiction: the 
“stream of commerce” test.91 The stream of commerce test states that 
where a corporate defendant has placed its product into the “regular and 
anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail 
sale,” and that product injures someone in the forum state, minimum 
contacts will be satisfied so long as the defendant is aware that its products 
are being marketed or sold in the forum state.92  
This test is somewhat broader than the “purposeful availment” test, as a 
corporate defendant’s actions can be less direct under the stream of 
commerce test; although Justice Brennan did not believe that this would 
lead to a differing outcome in the Asahi case.93 Justice Brennan opined 
that, under the stream of commerce test, a defendant will not be presented 
with a “burden for which there is no corresponding benefit,” meaning that 
a corporate defendant should not be able to escape the clutches of a court’s 
coercive arm if they have benefited economically from product sales in 
that forum state.94 
D. ‘Fair Play and Substantial Justice’ 
However, the minimum contacts test is not the only component of 
personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. In International Shoe, 
the Court stated that the defendant must have minimum contacts with the 
forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”95 In Burger King Corp. v. 
Redzewicz, the Court interpreted this to mean that once a court has run 
through a minimum contacts analysis, the court must then consider the 
defendant’s contacts in light of the reasonableness of exercising 
 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. at 105–06. 
 91. See id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Burger King Corp. v. Redzewicz, 471 U.S. 
462, 473 (1985). 
 92. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 117. 
 95. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (emphasis added). 
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jurisdiction over that defendant.96 A number of factors will be considered 
in determining the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction, including 
“[T]he burden on the defendant,” “the forum [s]tate’s interest in 
adjudicating the dispute,” “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining 
convenient and effective relief,” the interstate judicial system’s 
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,” 
and the “shared interests of the several [s]tates in furthering 
fundamental substantive social policies.”97 
However, the burden on the defendant is the most important of these 
factors.98 
E. Connection to the Litigation 
So far, this note has discussed several different theories under which a 
defendant can have minimum contacts and thereby can legally be haled 
into a court. A court can exercise general jurisdiction over a corporate 
defendant who is “at home” in the forum state, and specific jurisdiction 
over a defendant when that defendant’s contacts with the forum state are 
related to the controversy underlying the litigation. But does there exist a 
grey area between specific and general jurisdiction? What happens when a 
corporate defendant has extensive forum contacts that are insufficient for 
general jurisdiction and contacts connected with the litigation but 
insufficiently so for specific jurisdiction? 
Suppose, for example, that a corporate defendant had extensive 
contacts with a forum state. The defendant sells products in the state, 
markets in the state, and even owns facilities in the forum state, but is 
incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business elsewhere. 
Under such circumstances, the forum state would not have personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant under a general jurisdiction theory.99 Of 
course, the defendant could probably be haled into court under a theory of 
specific jurisdiction if an injury occurred at one of its in-state facilities or 
if one of its products sold in-state injured someone in-state. But in modern 
times, many large corporations sell their products across the entire United 
States, and some of these products will inevitably injure individuals in 
multiple states. If the product injures individuals in both states A and B, 
and the individuals from B sue in state A, what outcome would result 
under a specific jurisdiction analysis? 
 
 
 96. Burger King Corp. v. Redzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).  
 97. Id. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)). 
 98. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1786 (2017). 
 99. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 132 (2014). 
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One possible solution is a “sliding scale” approach to specific 
jurisdiction.100 Under this theory, the factors pursuant to “traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice” could make an exercise of 
personal jurisdiction reasonable under a lesser showing of minimum 
contacts.101 For example, if an exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant 
would place virtually no burdens on that defendant, then a lesser showing 
of minimum contacts may be acceptable.102 Contrastingly, if the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction would place a heavy burden on the defendant, a 
greater showing of minimum contacts may be necessary.103 
A possible extension of this sliding scale approach could be utilized 
whereby these “reasonableness” considerations could serve to establish 
reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of a defendant’s 
contacts being connected to the litigation.104 The Supreme Court of 
California formerly endorsed this theory of specific jurisdiction, but their 
theory was ultimately struck down by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.105 Although this theory would still require that the defendant’s 
contacts with the forum state bear some relation to the underlying 
controversy, this connection could be more indirect if the defendant’s 
contacts with the forum state were extensive.106 
This twilight zone between general and specific jurisdiction featured in 
the recent Supreme Court case Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court.107 
Bristol-Myers Squibb is a pharmaceutical company that sold a drug named 
“Plavix” across the United States.108 Ultimately this drug caused injuries to 
certain individuals, and some of these individuals filed suit in 
California.109 Some of these individuals bought the drug in California and 
were ultimately hurt by the drug in California.110 Some of the plaintiffs, 
however, were located in thirty-three other states.111 Bristol-Myers Squibb 
is incorporated in Delaware, and has its principal place of business in New 
York, so California does not have general jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers 
 
 
 100. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476–77.   
 101. See id. at 477 (“These considerations sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of 
jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required.”). 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. at 477–78. 
 104. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 891 (Cal. 2016). 
 105. Compare Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d 874 (Cal. 2016), with Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. 
Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 106. See Vons Cos. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 926 P.2d 1085, 1097 (Cal. 1996). 
 107. See generally Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. 1773. 
 108. Id. at 1777–78. 
 109. Id. at 1778. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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Squibb.112 This is despite Bristol-Myers Squibb’s extensive contacts with 
California: they maintained multiple facilities in the state, employed over 
150 employees in the state, and sold the drug in the state.113 Therefore, 
personal jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers Squibb for the California claims 
was a non-issue.114 However, personal jurisdiction over the non-resident 
claims was less obvious.115 
The Supreme Court of California followed its sliding scale approach in 
finding that California courts had specific jurisdiction over the Oklahoma 
claims.116 It reasoned that although the injuries occurred in other states, the 
injuries were related to Bristol-Myers Squibb’s California contacts 
indirectly in that the two tort claims are identical.117 
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, reversed.118 It 
explicitly rejected the “sliding scale” approach employed by the Supreme 
Court of California, finding it incompatible with Supreme Court precedent 
on specific jurisdiction.119 The court firmly stated that the defendant’s 
contacts must still bear a direct relationship to the underlying controversy, 
and that these reasonableness factors could not establish specific 
jurisdiction on a lesser or tenuous connection.120 The Supreme Court held, 
therefore, that a California state court could not exercise personal 
jurisdiction over the non-residents’ claims against Bristol-Myers Squibb 
given these facts.121 
ANALYSIS 
I. A CLASH OF PRINCIPLES 
From its inception, utilitarianism has had an intimate connection with 
the law. Indeed, in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation, Bentham even applied his felicific calculus to the law broadly, 
postulating that when governmental action conforms to the felicific 
calculus, it is a “law or dictate of utility.”122 Intentionally or not, the 
American legal system is brimming with rules, principles, and standards 
that mirror Bentham’s calculus in some fashion, balancing the pro-social 
against the anti-social. 
 
 
 112. Id. at 1777, 1780. 
 113. Id. at 1778. 
 114. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1782. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 889–90 (Cal. 2016). 
 117. See id. at 890–91. 
 118. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1773. 
 119. Id. at 1781. 
 120. Id. at 1782. 
 121. Id. at 1783. 
 122. See BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 3.  
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For example, when deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, 
a court, as a part of its analysis, will balance the harm of the movant 
should the injunction be denied against the non-movant’s harm should it 
be granted.123 Similarly, in analyzing a claim of violation of procedural 
due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, a court will 
weigh the private interest affected by the challenged official action, and 
the governmental interest that would be burdened if the court were to place 
new procedural requirements on the government.124 Broadly speaking, 
balancing tests, found in every corner of the law, all closely mirror the 
principle of utility formulated by Jeremy Bentham. The principle of utility 
is, however, contoured by other philosophical principles. This clash of 
principles can be seen in the doctrines of personal jurisdiction.125 
Our current personal jurisdiction doctrine contains utilitarian 
principles. With the “fair play and substantial justice” factors, the court 
balances all interests involved to effectively reach the solution that 
maximizes utility. The other half of our personal jurisdiction doctrine, the 
concept of “minimum contacts connected to the litigation,” is rooted 
firmly in principles of federalism. Ultimately, when these two sets of 
principles have clashed in the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence, federalism has trumped utilitarianism. 
The principles of utilitarianism can be seen in the concept of “fair play 
and substantial justice.” The factors inherent in traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice include the 
“[B]urden on the defendant,” “the forum [s]tate’s interest in 
adjudicating the dispute,” “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining 
convenient and effective relief,” “the interstate judicial system’s 
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,” 
and the “shared interests of the several [s]tates in furthering 
fundamental substantive social policies.”126  
Through these factors, a court effectively balances the interests of all 
parties and institutions, reaching a solution that maximizes pleasure and 
minimizes pain. These factors can preclude a state court’s exercise of 
personal jurisdiction even where a defendant has minimum contacts with 
the forum state connected to the litigation.127 However, these factors 
 
 
     123.   See Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981). 
     124.   See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 125. See generally Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 126. Burger King Corp. v. Redzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (quoting World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).  
 127. See id. 
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cannot give a state personal jurisdiction over a defendant where this 
minimum contacts test has not been met.128  
As noted above, personal jurisdiction analyses first begin by asking 
what contacts, if any, the defendant has with the forum state, and whether, 
through these contacts, the defendant has purposefully availed themselves 
of the laws of the forum state.129 Furthermore, these contacts must be 
connected to the litigation, or “systematic” enough to render the defendant 
“at home in the forum state.”130 This analysis does not involve any 
balancing of interests. Rather, this “minimum contacts” analysis is a 
bright-line rule, whereby a forum will not have personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant that does not meet this test even where other interests, such as 
those inherent in “fair play and substantial justice,” would point towards 
the court exercising personal jurisdiction.131 
This bright line rule is predicated on principles of federalism.132 The 
American political system divides power not only between the three 
branches of the federal government, but also between the federal 
government and the many states.133 This principle is enshrined in the 
Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.134 The many states 
thereby “retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in 
particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts.”135 The 
retainment of this power by the many states implies a negative limitation 
on the power of the other states.136 Therefore, even where a certain state 
would be the most fair or utilitarian place to litigate a case, the principle of 
federalism can foreclose that state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.137 
Although our current personal jurisdiction jurisprudence does contain 
elements of utilitarianism, these principles are countered by the blunt axe 
of federalism. This raises three questions. First, does this ordering of 
principles make sense doctrinally? Second, does this ordering of principles  
  
 
 
 128. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (“And at times, this federalism interest may be 
decisive. . . . even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to 
litigate before the tribunals of another [s]tate . . . .”).  
 129. See id. 
 130. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014). 
 131. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780. 
 132. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (“[R]estrictions [on the personal 
jurisdiction of state courts] are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant 
limitation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.”). 
 133. See id. 
 134. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 135. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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make sense pragmatically? Third, if the answer to either of the first two 
questions is no, what system, doctrine, or rule should replace our current 
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence? 
 
II. THE PROBLEM 
A. Doctrinal Issues with Current Personal Jurisdiction Jurisprudence 
In Shaffer v. Heitner and World-Wide Volkswagen, Justice Brennan’s 
dissents advanced a more liberal interpretation of International Shoe than 
is currently accepted by the Supreme Court.138 In Shaffer, he noted, 
Nonetheless, when a suitor seeks to lodge a suit in a State with a 
substantial interest in seeing its own law applied to the transaction 
in question, we could wisely act to minimize conflicts, confusion, 
and uncertainty by adopting a liberal view of jurisdiction, unless 
considerations of fairness or efficiency strongly point in the 
opposite direction.139  
If we follow Justice Brennan’s liberal interpretation of personal 
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause, modern personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence’s ordering of federalism over the more utilitarian values of 
“fair play and substantial justice” is inconsistent with International Shoe. 
Our current personal jurisdiction jurisprudence focuses too tightly on 
contacts, instead of the forum State’s interests and the actual 
inconvenience to the defendant that form the crux of the concept of “fair 
play and substantial justice.140 Instead of focusing solely on a defendant 
corporation’s contacts with the forum state, International Shoe focused on 
fairness and reasonableness, contacts with the forum state being merely 
one way of showing fairness or reasonableness.141 
Furthermore, International Shoe did not separate the concepts of 
“contacts” and “federalism” as concepts above and beyond the more 
utilitarian values of fair play and substantial justice.142 Instead, these 
concepts helped inform the determination of whether or not a state court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction comported with due process. 
For the terms ‘present’ or ‘presence’ are used merely to symbolize 
those activities of the corporation’s agent within the state which courts 
 
 
 138. Compare World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299–313 (Brennan, J., dissenting), with 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 139. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 225–26 (1977) (Brennan, J., Dissenting). 
 140. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299–300 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 141. Id. at 300. 
 142. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945). 
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will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process. These 
demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of 
the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of 
government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which 
is brought there.143 
Although International Shoe notes that one-off or tangential contacts 
unrelated to the litigation are not enough to satisfy due process, it states so 
not because such contacts would fall below a rigid “minimum contacts” 
formula, but rather because a state court’s exercise of jurisdiction would 
be unreasonable in such circumstances.144  
International Shoe explicitly rejected the idea of a rigid formula for 
personal jurisdiction under the due process clause. Instead, International 
Shoe held that a defendant’s contacts must be evaluated “in relation to the 
fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the 
due process clause to insure.”145 Under this liberal interpretation of 
International Shoe, a lesser showing of contacts would be sufficient if 
other considerations helped establish the reasonableness of the particular 
forum.146 These other considerations include the interests of the forum 
state and other interested parties, discussed previously.147 The actual 
burden on the defendant is another one of these considerations.148 
Furthermore, if there exists less burden on the defendant, a lesser showing 
of contacts would be sufficient for a state court to exercise personal 
jurisdiction.149 
Although this different, more liberal interpretation of personal 
jurisdiction does not place federalism on a pedestal, that is not to say that 
federalism would never come into play in the “fair play and substantial 
justice” calculus; it would only be relevant insofar as it helped determine 
whether a state court’s exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable. If, for 
example, a state’s interest in hearing a cause of action were so small that it 
would point towards an exercise of jurisdiction not being constitutional, 
federalism would then become a cognizable interest in this liberal personal 
jurisdiction calculus. It is important to note, however, that even the 
 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 317 (“To require the corporation to defend the suit in such circumstances . . . has been 
thought to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due process.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 145. Id. at 319. 
 146. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 147. Id.; see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 222–23 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (“I believe that our cases fairly establish that the State’s valid substantive interests 
are important considerations in assessing whether it constitutionally may claim jurisdiction over a 
given cause of action.”). 
 148. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 300–01 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 149. Id. at 301. 
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Supreme Court’s current personal jurisdiction jurisprudence does not 
require an exercise of personal jurisdiction to be in the best forum state 
possible.150 Additionally, a state court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction 
isn’t constitutionally impermissible merely because multiple states could, 
theoretically, exercise jurisdiction over the cause of action.151 
It is worth emphasizing that although Federalism is embodied in our 
constitutional system through the Tenth Amendment, it is found nowhere 
in the text or history of the Due Process Clause specifically.152 The 
Supreme Court, before Bristol-Myers Squibb, even noted as such, stressing 
that although personal jurisdiction does in fact restrict state power, “it 
‘must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest 
preserved by the Due Process Clause’ rather than as a function ‘of 
federalism concerns.’”153 This stands in stark contrast to the Court’s 
pronouncement in Bristol-Myers Squibb that “this federalism interest may 
be decisive . . . ‘even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no 
inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another 
[s]tate.’”154 
B. Pragmatic Issues with Current Personal Jurisdiction Jurisprudence 
However, even if we accept Justice Brennan’s more liberal 
interpretation of International Shoe, there is a fair argument that this test is 
obsolete. Justice Brennan even admitted as such in World-Wide 
Volkswagen, noting that the “principle, with its almost exclusive focus on 
the rights of defendants, may be outdated.”155 As Justice Marshall 
commented in the majority opinion of Shaffer, 
“Traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” can be as 
readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no 
longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures that are 
 
 
 150. See Schaffer, 433 U.S. at 228. 
 151. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 301 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Under even the 
most restrictive view of International Shoe, several States could have jurisdiction over a particular 
cause of action. We need only determine whether the forum States in these cases satisfy the 
constitutional minimum.”). 
 152. See Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical 
Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112, 1114 (1981) (“These limitations on state authority are imposed in 
the name of the clause, regardless of whether private parties—the ultimate beneficiaries of these 
protections—are in danger of suffering real injustice.”). 
 153. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72, n.13 (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ireland 
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702–03, n.10 (1982)). 
 154. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (quoting 
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294). 
 155. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage.156 
As noted above, International Shoe represented a step in a long process 
of liberalizing personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.157 This change was 
predicated on the monumental shift in the national economy between the 
times of Pennoyer v. Neff and International Shoe: 
In part, this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our 
national economy over the years. Today, many commercial 
transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties 
separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization 
of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business 
conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time, modern 
transportation and communication have made it much less 
burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he 
engages in economic activity.158 
Justice Brennan recognized these economic changes, and as early as 
1980, noted that the world forming the backdrop of International Shoe no 
longer existed: 
The model of society on which the International Shoe Court based 
its opinion is no longer accurate. Business people, no matter how 
local their businesses, cannot assume that goods remain in the 
business’ locality. Customers and goods can be anywhere else in the 
country usually in a matter of hours and always in a matter of a very 
few days. . . . I cannot see how a defendant’s right to due process is 
violated if the defendant suffers no inconvenience.159  
If the economy had fundamentally changed between the time of 
International Shoe and 1980, it has certainly changed between 1980 and 
the present day, especially considering the heralding of the information 
age. Much like the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century, the 
advent of information technology in the late twentieth century has 
fundamentally rearranged the economic ordering of society.160 With the 
advent of the internet, the changes in the national economy are becoming 
ever more pressing. With the click of a button, an individual in St. Louis, 
Missouri, can, by using their computer, send data to a corporation based in 
 
 
 156. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977). 
 157. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 158. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957). 
 159. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 309 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
     160.  Peter F. Drucker, The Age of Social Transformation, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 53 (Nov. 
1994).  
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Seattle, Washington,161 in order to purchase a product produced in China, 
to be transported by another corporation located in Atlanta, Georgia.162 
Personal jurisdiction doctrine has not remained static over time. 
Instead, the doctrine has evolved from a rigid formula to the relatively 
more flexible doctrine exhibited by International Shoe and its progeny.163 
Personal jurisdiction, as conceptualized in Pennoyer, looked quite 
different than the doctrine we see today. Under Pennoyer, in order for a 
state court to have personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, that 
defendant must have been physically present in the forum, or must bring 
themselves into the state voluntarily. International Shoe dispensed with 
this rigid formula, creating the personal jurisdiction doctrine taught to 
first-year law students today.164 
A cornerstone of constitutional interpretation is the evolution of 
doctrine to fit the economic realities of the current times.165 Technological 
and economic development is the primary catalyst behind this change in 
doctrine.166 In the personal jurisdiction context, the Pennoyer rule became 
impractical as commerce between the several states increased, considering 
the technological progression throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.167  
In the 1930s, the Supreme Court overturned prior precedent 
surrounding the Commerce Clause to allow for more expansive regulation 
of the national economy.168 The background behind this change was 
 
 
 161. This hypothetical scenario is referencing Amazon, which in 2015 became more valuable than 
Walmart. See Jodi Kantor & David Streitfield, Inside Amazon: Wrestling Ideas in a Bruising 
Workplace, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/technology/inside-
amazon-wrestling-big-ideas-in-a-bruising-workplace.html. As the economy shifts into the digital age, 
more individuals are purchasing goods and services through the internet instead of walking down the 
street to the local grocery store, implicating corporations across state boundaries. 
 162. Privacy Notice, UPS.COM, https://www.ups.com/us/en/help-center/legal-terms-
conditions/privacy-notice.page. 
 163. Compare Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), with Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 
U.S. 714 (1877) (holding that a state court could only exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident 
defendant if that defendant held property in the forum state). 
 164. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.  
 165. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (noting that the dictates of the Fourth 
Amendment must keep pace with technological and societal changes in order for its protections to be 
effective). 
 166. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 167. See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957) (“[T]oday many commercial 
transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With 
this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business 
conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern transportation and communication have 
made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in 
economic activity.”). 
 168. Compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), with United States v. Darby Lumber 
Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
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predicated, in large part, by changes in the national economy, which 
prompted both state government and the federal government to enact new 
laws and regulations concerning the economy.169 Naturally, these new 
regulations were challenged on constitutional grounds.170 
The coming of the information age has similarly catalyzed changes in 
established Supreme Court precedents. In 2018, the Supreme Court 
overruled fifty-one years of prior precedent when it held that a state can 
impose a sales tax on online retailers without violating the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.171 Previously, the Dormant Commerce Clause 
prevented states from imposing a sales tax on mail order resellers or online 
retailers unless those entities had a physical presence in the state.172 The 
South Dakota legislature instituted such a sales tax anyway, declaring a 
state of emergency over its diminishing tax revenue.173 
However, the Court in Wayfair recognized that stare decisis is not an 
“inexorable command,”174 especially where changed circumstances 
suggest its inapplicability,175 overturning Bellas Hess and Quill. 
Specifically, the Court recognized that the modern information economy 
necessitated the reconsideration of Bellas Hess and Quill. 
Further, the real world implementation of Commerce Clause 
doctrines now makes it manifest that the physical presence rule as 
defined by Quill must give way to the ‘far-reaching systemic and 
structural changes in the economy’ and ‘many other societal 
dimensions’ caused by the Cyber Age. . . . When it decided Quill, 
the Court could not have envisioned a world in which the world's 
largest retailer would be a remote seller.  
The Internet's prevalence and power have changed the dynamics of 
the national economy. In 1992, mail-order sales in the United States 
totaled $180 billion. Last year, e-commerce retail sales alone were 
estimated at $453.5 billion. Combined with traditional remote 
sellers, the total exceeds half a trillion dollars.176 
  
 
 
 169. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 121–24. 
 170. See id. 
 171. See South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (overturning National Bellas Hess 
v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)). 
 172. See generally Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. 753; Quill, 504 U.S. 298. 
 173. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2088. 
 174. Id. at 2096 (“Although we approach the reconsideration of our decisions with the utmost 
caution, stare decisis is not an inexorable command.”) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 
(2009)). 
 175. See id. 
 176. See id. at 2097 (citations omitted).  
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It is time for such a change in our doctrines of personal jurisdiction. 
But if our current conception of personal jurisdiction should be scrapped, 
what new doctrine or framework should replace it? In the next section, 
such a new framework will be discussed. 
 
III. THE SOLUTION 
 
In light of the foregoing considerations, a new formula for personal 
jurisdiction should be established, modeled after two-level utilitarianism: 
under the Due Process Clause, a state court can exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a corporate defendant in every instance where the 
defendant has (1) placed their products in the stream of commerce, (2) 
those products have wound up in the forum state, and (3) the defendant 
could reasonably foresee the products ending up in the forum state; 
however, a state court can also exercise jurisdiction over a corporate 
defendant where that exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable under utilitarian 
principles. 
The stream of commerce component represents the archangel half of 
this new formulation. The stream of commerce, as articulated by Justice 
Brennan in Asahi,177 is a better fit in today’s interconnected, multi-
jurisdictional world. In today’s world, the practical distinction between a 
corporation purposefully availing themselves and inserting their products 
into the stream of commerce collapses when one removes “connected to 
the litigation” from the analysis.178 The reasonableness component 
represents the prole half of this new formulation. It returns the personal 
jurisdiction analysis to its utilitarian core: the reasonableness of the state 
court’s exercise of jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
 177. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior. Court. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (Brennan, 
J., concurring). 
 178. As an example, let us say that an online store sold widgets in all fifty states. By selling 
widgets in all fifty states, it has purposefully availed itself of the laws of all fifty states. A plaintiff 
could hypothetically buy the widget in state A and then travel to state B where the harm occurs, a state 
for which the online store has already “purposefully availed” itself. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
138 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 11:1 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
With economic change comes the evolution of constitutional doctrine. 
With the coming of the information age and the advent of one-click 
shopping, bright-line rules resting upon vague notions of federalism are 
impractical for determining if and when a state court can constitutionally 
exercise its coercive power over an out-of-state defendant. Instead, the 
Supreme Court should look to Two-Level Utilitarianism as a guide, being 
an “archangel” unless fair play and substantial justice command it to be a 
prole.  
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